[1]庄品.基于全部数量折扣契约的供应链激励机制研究[J].苏州市职业大学学报,2008,(02):26-29.
 ZHUANG Pin,ZHANG Qing.Resear ch on Supply Chain Coordination Incentive Mechanism Based on All Quantity Discount Contr act Model[J].,2008,(02):26-29.
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基于全部数量折扣契约的供应链激励机制研究
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《苏州市职业大学学报》[ISSN:1008-5475/CN:32-1524/G4]

卷:
期数:
2008年02期
页码:
26-29
栏目:
出版日期:
2008-06-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Resear ch on Supply Chain Coordination Incentive Mechanism Based on All Quantity Discount Contr act Model
文章编号:
1008- 5475( 2008) 02- 0026-04
作者:
庄品1 2 张庆1
( 1.南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏南京210016; 2.东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京210096)
Author(s):
ZHUANG Pin1 2 ZHANG Qing1
( 1.Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China; 2.Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China)
关键词:
关键词: 供应链管理 激励机制 全部数量折扣契约 非线性需求
Keywords:
Key words: supply chain management incentive mechanism all quantity discount contract non - linear demand
分类号:
F406.2
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
摘要: 市场需求为非线性需求, 包含一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链模型, 利用Stackelberg 博弈理论设计了集中控制下供应链契约模型和分散控制下供应链契约模型, 研究显示分散控制下系统利润低于集中控制下系统利润, 产生了“双向边际效应”。设计一种全部数量折扣供应链契约模型, 使供应链系统达到协调, 并利用实例对契约模型进行数值仿真分析, 最后得出研究结论。
Abstract:
Abstr act: A two- level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with non- linear demand is developed. Supply contracts under central control and under decentralized control are based on Stackelberg game theory. Analyses show that system profit under decentralized control is lower than under central control, and leads to “double marginalization”. All- unit quantity discount contract is designed to achieve supply chain system coordination, and simulative results are given and analyzed.
更新日期/Last Update: 2008-08-20